More on the WEF
From an original comment on FB by Raymond Lavallee
When
Stephen Harper arrived in office in 2006 with a sharp economic
identity: austerity, fiscal discipline, resource-driven growth, global
investment, and unwavering support for market-centric governance. The
WEF was a perfect match. It wasn’t a social club or a symbolic stop on
the diplomatic circuit — it was a strategic megaphone. From Davos,
Harper could speak over the heads of domestic politics and communicate
Canada’s economic philosophy directly to global capital. He didn’t just
appear at the WEF; he championed it. He repeatedly described Davos as
“an indispensable part of the global conversation” on stability and
growth, and he meant it.
The
peak of Harper’s relationship with the WEF came during the 2008–09
global financial crisis. While markets convulsed, governments panicked,
and economic forecasts fell apart, Harper knew that investor confidence
shapes reality as much as legislation does. So he did what many leaders
avoided: he went to Davos in the middle of the chaos. From the WEF
stage, he told the world Canada was stable — its banks were solid, its
lending rules strict, its fiscal framework predictable. It was a
masterclass in market reassurance. Harper used Davos to brand Canada as
the safest port in a storm, and foreign investment followed. It wasn’t
luck; it was strategy. Davos didn’t shape Harper — Harper used Davos to
shape the world’s perception of Canada.
What
made Harper and the WEF such perfect ideological partners was that
neither had to pretend. The WEF’s mantra — deregulation, free trade,
resource export expansion, private capital as the primary engine of
progress — wasn’t something Harper tolerated; it was his worldview
already. Harper didn’t go to Davos to network with strangers who might
influence him. He went because he was already one of them. Davos
celebrated him during the crisis era not as an up-and-comer but as the
model of fiscally conservative governance. He became, for a time, the
poster child of technocratic capitalism.
Harper
also used Davos as a sales floor for his energy agenda. He pitched the
oil sands, pipelines, and fossil-megaprojects as reliable long-term
investments protected from geopolitical disruptions. He framed Canada’s
resource sector as a bastion of global energy security — and in Davos,
that message landed exactly the way he wanted it to. In a room full of
sovereign funds, oil companies, and major lenders, Harper wasn’t just a
politician. He was a salesman with a stable product.
All
of this matters because the modern right has reinvented the WEF not as a
conference, but as a monster. If attendance at Davos truly signalled
subservience to a shadowy cabal, then Harper — not Mark Carney — would
be the greatest villain of the conspiracy universe. But that’s not how
these narratives work. The WEF only became “dangerous” once fear became
politically profitable. When the WEF was useful to conservatives, it was
praised. When it became useful to demonize rivals, it was turned into
the boogeyman.
Harper
didn’t fear Davos. He admired it because he understood its value. He
didn’t see it as a threat to sovereignty — he saw it as a stage where a
smart leader could control a global narrative. Today’s anti-WEF rhetoric
isn’t about sovereignty or patriotism. It’s about weaponizing
ignorance. And the proof is simple: when the right needed Davos, they
applauded it. When they needed rage, they attacked it. The WEF never
changed — only the politics did.

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